

CRITICAL INCIDENT AT BROOKLYN HOMES

JULY 1-2, 2023



AFTER-ACTION REVIEW SUMMARY

**Baltimore Police Department
Compliance Bureau**

Report to the Police Commissioner & Performance Review Board
Published August 2023

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APPROACH TO AAR - METHODOLOGY

- **On July 3, 2023, Acting PC Worley directed the Performance Review Board (PRB) to review the incident per Policy 724**
 - PRB typically used to review uses of force
 - PC can refer any critical incident to the PRB
 - Policy focuses on departmental improvement
 - Requires any information discovered that could be a policy violation to be referred to internal affairs for a formal investigation
 - Referrals to Public Integrity Bureau will be completed before the end of this month
- **BPD's Compliance Bureau took lead on the After-Action Review to determine the following:**
 - What were BPD's planning / staffing / deployment preparations for the Southern District on this day and specifically in relation to Brooklyn Day events?
 - What information was known by the Southern District Intel Section, Citywide Intel Section, or Southern District Neighborhood Unit about the Brooklyn Day events?
 - What calls for service / Body Worn Camera / CCTV data is there?
 - What was the quality of the BPD's response to the scene? Scene Management & Evidence Collection? Victim/Witness interactions?

SUMMARY TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS

- **June 28 / 1:00pm** - Analyst and Open Source Unit (OSU) supervisor reports that they contacted SD Intel Officer to advise of a social media post which referred to “Brooklyn Saturday.” There was no additional information provided in the post and OSU was unable to ascertain any additional information. OSU reports that the posting disappeared and they were unable to find it again. Patrol is asked by intel to look for evidence of this. There is no indication of follow up on this request or action by intel to physically go to the location.
- **July 1 / 7:00 a.m. – 5:00 p.m.:** Brooklyn Day event organizers and vendors begin arriving in and around the 800 Block of Gretna Court and the 800 Block of Clintwood Court. Tables are set up and food vendors are preparing for the Brooklyn Day event. Based on flyers obtained through this AAR, **the event is advertised to begin at 5 p.m. but does not have an endpoint defined.**

SUMMARY TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS

- July 1 / 5:00 p.m. – 7:00 p.m.: **Crowds begin to form as the Brooklyn Day events commence.** During this period, there is at least one BPD unit that is present on scene for a short time. Based on a review of CCTV camera, there are also indications of **CCTV cameras being manually operated** or monitored multiple times during this period to observe the crowds.
- July 1 / 6:57 p.m. - Call for Service (CFS): A call comes in reporting a **disorderly incident** at a location near 10th St. and Rennick Court (close proximity to the Brooklyn Day events). Caller reports that “It’s Brooklyn Day” and two vehicles are **driving recklessly** at the location. According to review of the Audio Transcript, “It’s Brooklyn Day” is not read out to the responding Officer; however, if the responding unit was utilizing their Mobile Data Terminal, they would be able to use it to see this note in the call text.

SUMMARY TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS

- **July 1 / 9:41 p.m. - CFS:** A call comes in at the 800 Block of Gretna Court for an **Armed Person**. Complainant states that **“Hundreds of males and females are armed with guns and knives”** at the location. This call is not assigned for response until 10:14 p.m. (approximately 30 minutes after the call came in). A subsequent radio transmission by an Officer in response to this call is made saying, **“We might have to redirect that call to the National Guard then.”** The dispatcher later indicates that the district is “10-12” or that no units in the district are available for new calls for service.
- **July 1 / 10:37 p.m. - Foxtrot Flyover:** Foxtrot estimates 700 people at the location and communicates this to the Supervisor in the Southern District, who acknowledges then advises, “We got a call for discharging in the area, anything look suspicious?” **Foxtrot responds: “No, negative. You have a lot of fireworks being discharged that are actually still going off right now. As far as the group inside the Brooklyn Homes everything appears to be normal right now. They’re just walking around, hanging out.”**

SUMMARY TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS

- **July 1 / 10:30 p.m. – July 2 / 12:37 a.m.** – Evertel traffic:
 - 10:30 pm: Sergeant posted,** *"Just a heads up for midnight shift. Looks like the citizens of Brooklyn snuck in 'Brooklyn Day' on us. There are roughly 800-900 people in the homes."*
 - 10:59 pm: Captain replied,** *"Appreciate it. Anyone that wants some OT tonight the check book is open!"*
 - 11:12 pm: Captain posted,** *"Midnights please do a check of Brooklyn homes first thing. If resources are needed please advise."*
 - 11:30 pm: Lieutenant responded,** *"Copy Sir, [Supervisor] is enroute to Brooklyn Homes."*
 - 11:53 pm: Lieutenant posted,** *"Brooklyn Homes large amount of foot and vehicle traffic. [Supervisor] monitoring and will post updates here."*
 - 11:55 pm: Captain replied,** *"Thank you."*
 - 11:56 pm: Sergeant posted a picture of a crowd stating,** *"8th and Jack St."*
 - 11:57 pm: Captain wrote,** *"I'll let Unit 41 know in the case we need staff."*
 - 12:11 am: Major posted,** *"Monitor only don't get drawn in and become a target."*
 - 12:12 am: Sergeant replied,** *"10-4."*
 - 12:26 am: Captain posted,** *"I advised [Unit 41 who is on duty] until 0130."*
 - 12:37 am: Lieutenant posted,** *"Multiple calls for a shooting Brooklyn Homes. Units enroute."*

SUMMARY TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS


- **July 2 / 12:01 a.m. - Text Message:** Command in the Southern texts Unit 41 indicating the following: **“Brooklyn homes surprised us with their community party tonight. I have [a supervisor] monitoring. For now, no resources are needed but just wanted to give a heads up.”** Unit 41 acknowledges. Command in the Southern then texts Unit 41, **“Thank you. We had no idea they planned this.”**
- **July 2 / 12:32 a.m. – 1:19 a.m. - CFS:** At least **26 separate CFS** come in over the next hour for additional reports of **shootings** at the 800 Block of Gretna Court, the 800 Block of Herndon Court and nearby locations.

FINDINGS FROM EQUITY ANALYSIS

- Review of Calls for Service Volume:

Key Finding:

The patrol assignment (Post 913) where Brooklyn Homes is located has historically been in the **top 1% of busiest patrol geographies in the entire city** (prior to redistricting). The boundaries of Post 913 had not been updated in decades, resulting in a **single patrol officer being responsible for a significantly higher volume of workload in that area in comparison to any other post in the Southern District or nearly the entire city.**



FINDINGS FROM EQUITY ANALYSIS

- Review of Calls for Service in Southern District (Dispositions)

Post Number	A - Unfounded	B - Unable to Locate Compliant	C - No Such Address	D - No Police Service Necessary	E - Gone on Arrival	F - Complaint Abated	X - Report Written	Z - False Alarm	Grand Total	% of Total
911	235	132	6	1,449	352	853	704	35	3,766	7.8%
912	58	85	5	678	173	323	346	18	1,686	3.5%
913	502	392	14	3,722	597	1,597	1,677	67	8,568	17.7%
921	55	96	4	544	107	421	450	11	1,688	3.5%
922	225	372	13	2,056	431	1,545	1,546	73	6,261	12.9%
923	74	97	5	947	217	711	594	41	2,686	5.5%
931	74	126	3	1,116	274	441	477	14	2,525	5.2%
932	122	146	3	1,823	282	588	811	41	3,816	7.9%
933	30	50	5	303	67	164	228	5	852	1.8%
934	104	118	6	1,299	319	624	596	6	3,072	6.3%
935	64	106	4	1,053	301	546	618	19	2,711	5.6%
941	97	206	6	1,512	432	974	976	28	4,231	8.7%
942	99	149	7	1,419	458	771	740	130	3,773	7.8%
943	63	121	3	1,204	341	562	529	51	2,874	5.9%
Grand Total	1,802	2,196	84	19,125	4,351	10,120	10,292	539	48,509	
% of Total	3.7%	4.5%	0.2%	39.4%	9.0%	20.9%	21.2%	1.1%		
Post 913	5.9%	4.6%	0.2%	43.4%	7.0%	18.6%	19.6%	0.8%		



Key Finding:

*Officer indifference may have compromised the awareness, planning and response to Brooklyn Day prior to the large crowds arriving. Members of the community can view such indifference (whether real or perceived) as a form of bias and from the community's perspective, **delayed response time, failing to take reports, and clearing calls without sufficient follow up can also be interpreted as officer indifference.***

- The data for 2022 shows that Post 913 received a significantly higher number of calls for service than another post in the Southern District. This information is further corroborated by the previous figure which shows data from the 2019-2021 periods.
- In comparison to the Southern District as a whole, post 913 also had **more dispositions** where the incident was determined by officers to be **unfounded (A)**, or **no police service was necessary (D)**, and **fewer instances** where the subject of the complaint was **gone when police arrived (E)**, the **complaint was abated** by police presence (F) or a **report** documenting the incident was completed by an officer (X).

FINDINGS FROM EQUITY ANALYSIS

- Historic proactivity vs. Crime in Brooklyn Neighborhood (July 2020 – June 2023)



Key Finding:

Based on 2020-2023 records, the Brooklyn Homes area had not received sufficient proactive efforts (foot patrols, directed patrols, business checks, etc.) when compared with historic crime rates.

FINDINGS FROM EQUITY ANALYSIS

- BPD's Equity Officer gathered information from various stakeholders, community members, organizational leaders, and former BPD personnel which led to the following Key Findings:

Key Finding:

*Sustained staffing shortages across patrol functions likely contributed to the Southern District's **inability to develop positive informal community relationships** in Brooklyn that could have served as a source of intelligence to learn about Brooklyn Day prior to July 1.*

Key Finding:

*BPD Commanders and NCOs **over-rely on transactional and formal community** associations to learn about community events, in lieu of building informal relationships through proactive engagement of residents. This likely led to a lack of situational awareness of the Brooklyn Day events prior to July 1. **When such informal relationships and information is obtained, there is no formal structure to develop continuity planning** for new commanders or develop calendar notifications when events are likely to occur again that took place in prior years.*

FINDINGS FROM REVIEW OF STAFFING

Staffing Complements Working in the Southern District on July 1, 2023 leading up to the crucial incident (at 12:30am)

B Shift	7:00am	8:00am	9:00am	10:00am	11:00am	12:00pm	1:00pm	2:00pm
Officers	16	16	16	16	15	15	15	15
Sergeants	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Lieutenants	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
C Shift	3:00pm	4:00pm	5:00pm	6:00pm	7:00pm	8:00pm	9:00pm	10:00pm
Officers	17	17	17	17	15	14	14	12
Sergeants	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Lieutenants	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
A Shift	11:00pm	12:00am	1:00am					
Officers	13	13	13					
Sergeants	1	1	1					
Lieutenants	2	1	1					

Key Finding:

*Each of the three Southern District patrol shifts (day, evening, & night), **began each shift either at or above their full complement** of officers on the date of the critical incident, which was achieved through the use of voluntary overtime and involuntary drafting.*

FINDINGS FROM REVIEW OF STAFFING

- In the hours during Brooklyn Day events and leading up to the critical incident:
- 31 District Action Team and District Detective Unit officers available citywide
- 1 SGT and 21 Officers on Downtown Deployment
- On Charlie Shift for ALL Districts: 141 officers working
- On Adam Shift for ALL Districts: 114 officers working

Key Finding:

*On the date of the critical incident, there were several dozen discretionary officers available from other parts of the City that could have been deployed to Brooklyn Day to manage the event prior to the shootings, **but they were never requested by the Southern District** until after the critical incident.*

Key Finding:

*The Charlie Shift Commander **released and relieved the Charlie shift** knowing that there was a crowd of 800 to 900 people that would require additional resources beyond those of the oncoming Adam shift. The communication with Southern District Command gave the impression that they had just learned of the large crowd, when in fact it was known for some time.*

Key Finding:

*The Southern District Command made attempts to address the situation once it was learned, **but asked for volunteers** from the Charlie shift to stay and work overtime **instead of directing the entire shift to remain on duty.***

FINDINGS FROM REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE

Key Finding:

*The Open Source Intel Unit captured **only one social media post about Brooklyn Day** and did not adequately capture or identify any additional social media postings about Brooklyn Day prior to the event. **The unit did not have staff scheduled to work or monitor social media on July 1.** Had those personnel been available, they may have processed social media posts about Brooklyn Day that were happening in real time.*

Key Finding:



*Upon receiving the limited intelligence from the Open Source Intel Unit three days in advance of Brooklyn Day, **the Southern District did not act to develop additional information** or determine the reliability of the intelligence received. There was no intel gathering plan implemented by the District Command, nor any planning for the possibility of Brooklyn Day taking place on July 1 as the intel suggested.*

Key Finding:

*The sector supervisors on both the Baker and Charlie shifts **failed to properly inspect deployments** and areas of responsibilities on July 1. Had they adequately inspected their areas of responsibilities, it would have been clear that Brooklyn Day was taking place.*



FINDINGS FROM REVIEW OF CAD RECORDS

- BPD recorded several proactivity efforts around Brooklyn Homes on July 1 on Baker and Charlie Shift



FINDINGS FROM REVIEW OF CAD RECORDS

- BPD responded to several calls for service around Brooklyn Homes on July 1 on Baker and Charlie Shift



Key Finding:

*As Brooklyn Day events were happening, officers working in the Southern District during the day and evening shifts did not appear to send any information to supervisors or commanders about the event. Officers were responding to calls for service and completing proactive engagements **in sufficient proximity to the event location** that would put them in a position to observe the large crowds and vehicular traffic and make notifications to supervisors.*

FINDINGS FROM REVIEW OF RADIO AND INTERNAL COMMS

Key Finding:

*The Charlie shift Sector Sergeants, the Sergeant in Charge, and the Gold Badge Lieutenant gave very little consideration on the potential public safety concerns of having a crowd size of 800 to 900 people without sufficient police presence. **These members failed to share the information about the large gatherings for Brooklyn Day in a timely manner.***

Key Finding:

*The Southern District Command **should not have directed that officers simply stay on the perimeter** of the Brooklyn Day event without any follow up direction on how to engage the large gathering. Southern District Command also **failed to immediately request additional resources**, nor was there any direction given to personnel to try to identify event organizers prior to the critical incident.*


FINDINGS FROM REVIEW OF BWC/CCTV

- **The Performance Standards Section reviewed 247 Hours of CCTV** video footage, **8 hours of BWC videos** and compared them with **13 hours of recorded radio transmissions and CAD data** for the After-Action Review.
- **During Baker Shift** - The start of the gathering includes the arrival of a U-Haul truck carrying folding tables and the formation of separate crowds of people. As the groups began to multiply, a trailer arrived transporting horses, and vehicular and pedestrian traffic increased.



FINDINGS FROM REVIEW OF BWC/CCTV

- **Charlie Shift-** The majority of the Brooklyn Homes activities included individuals operating grills, serving food to people in line formation, horse trailers arrive for pony rides, individuals openly consuming what appeared to be alcohol, dirt bike operators traveling throughout the neighborhood, the explosion of fireworks, pedestrians congregating in the roadways, large groups of pedestrians occasionally sprinting in different directions, and vehicular traffic stopping at a standstill.



FINDINGS FROM REVIEW OF BWC/CCTV

Key Finding:

CitiWatch personnel had manually operated the cameras around Brooklyn Homes, at 12:24 p.m. by one individual, and at 7:35 p.m. by a second individual. These camera operators observed the crowd activity but neither person appears to have made any notifications to supervisors or advised any issues over radio traffic during their respective shifts. A third individual in CitiWatch would later make notifications at 10:15 p.m. over the radio citing the large crowd size.

Key Finding:

Charlie shift Supervisors (and one officer on Charlie shift) were completing calls for service and assigning dispositions to those calls throughout the day; however, there are no body worn camera videos from these members to capture this work, which is a potential policy violation.

OTHER FINDINGS

Key Finding:

*Members of BPD largely adhered to BPD policies on crime scene management and scene control, but due to the area being rather large, covered with debris, and the need to permit residents to enter and exit their homes, **it may have been possible to overlook certain pieces of evidence from the initial canvass. BPD conducted the appropriate follow-up work to ensure every effort was made to collect any items of evidentiary value.***

Key Finding:

*Officers who arrived on the scene of the critical incident adhered to **the proper training on life-saving measures. The conduct by many of those officers demonstrably saved lives, and in many cases represents heroic efforts that went above and beyond the call of duty.***

Key Finding:

***BPD Dispatchers performed well** during the critical incident. They were able to deliver real-time information to units in the field in an expedited manner. They **maintained radio discipline and ensured proper coordination of resources** that were eventually dispatched from across the city to Brooklyn Homes in the aftermath of the shooting incidents.*

RECOMMENDATIONS (STAFFING)

Recommendation 1:

Adhere to the new post geographies from redistricting that better align patrol staffing resources in the Brooklyn neighborhood (and across the City) so that historical inequities among posts can be reduced and provide more equitable policing services across all neighborhoods.

Recommendation 2:

Further enhance recruitment efforts to bolster patrol staffing, with the long-term goal of meeting the staffing plan targets for patrol officer time dedicated to proactive community engagement.

RECOMMENDATIONS (INTELLIGENCE)

Recommendation 3:

Develop a more comprehensive notification protocol between district intelligence officers and district command staff to ensure proper situational awareness of large gatherings can be achieved and proper planning can be implemented.

Recommendation 4:

Standardize the use of Evertel for Districts to ensure that intelligence channels are available for command review and instruct intel officers to fully utilize the Evertel system for information sharing on large scale events.

Recommendation 5:

Ensure that the regular schedules for intelligence units and neighborhood coordination units include sufficient weekend coverage and that available technology resources are being fully utilized to provide Districts with greater situational awareness regarding social media postings about large events.

RECOMMENDATIONS (OPERATIONAL PROTOCOLS)

Recommendation 6:

Update standard operating procedures on how officers and supervisors interact with large scale events to ensure safe and appropriate de-escalation of such events can take place.

Recommendation 7:

Review training on policies and BPD protocols for evidence and crime scene management in order to ensure proper coordination of external resources for large scale critical incidents. Update protocols to ensure Forensics personnel and Operations Bureau personnel are required to coordinate on decision-making that could impact evidence collection efforts on large crime scenes.

RECOMMENDATIONS (COMMUNITY)

Recommendation 8:

All District Commands should instruct NCOs to develop a “neighborhood summary” for each neighborhood of their Districts. These summaries should include as much information as possible about annual or regularly scheduled public gatherings, events, ceremonies, vigils, etc. so that situational awareness in the district can be maintained if leadership of a District or an NCO unit changes.

RECOMMENDATIONS (POLICY & TRAINING)

Recommendation 9:

Conduct periodic exercises that follow Incident Command System (ICS) best practices for BPD personnel to prepare for responses to large scale critical incidents. Such exercises should include tabletop, functional and full-scale formats with the goal of identifying and correcting any gaps, educating members on ICS protocols, and enhancing BPD's general readiness for such incidents.

Recommendation 10:

BPD will prioritize the delivery of Diversity, Equity, Inclusion and Accessibility (DEIA) training for Commanders throughout the Department in addition to all BPD members receiving refresher training on BPD's Equity Policy during their next in-service training cycle.

RECOMMENDATIONS (REFERRALS)

Recommendation 11:

The Compliance Bureau shall forward this After-Action Review to the Public Integrity Bureau for review and further investigation for any misconduct violations in accordance with [BPD Policy 724](#).

Recommendation 12:

The Compliance Bureau shall refer any members where exemplary conduct was identified during the course of the After-Action Review (especially life-saving efforts), to the Meritorious Service Board, such that members can receive special recognition in accordance with [BPD Policy 724](#) and [BPD Policy 1712](#).




HABC After Action Report

Key Findings and Recommendations



Content

- Timeline
 - Findings
 - Recommendations
 - Status
- 

Timeline

Sunday, July 2, 2023

- At 3:00 a.m. HABC Executive Staff was notified about the mass shooting that took place at Brooklyn Homes by the Baltimore City Police Department.
- Alert Media notification about the incident sent to HABC management and staff at 4:24 a.m.
- HABC Staff from the Executive Team, Public Housing Operations (Operations), Office of Resident Services (ORS), Office of Communications arrived on site at Brooklyn Homes.
- ORS began trauma response protocols, which included canvassing residents impacted to provide support and resources.
- HABC staff cleared site of trash and debris that was left from the event.
- Brooklyn Homes Community Center was opened from 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.

Monday, July 3, 2023

- The Brooklyn Homes management office was open for normal operations, and the management team began accepting maintenance and transfer requests.
- ORS Staff was present at Brooklyn Homes to provide support and resources to residents.
- HABC staff participated in the Mayor's Community Meeting at Brooklyn Homes.

Tuesday, July 4, 2023

- ORS Staff was present at Brooklyn Homes to provide support and resources to residents; and assisted with collecting names of residents seeking transfers.

Wednesday, July 5, 2023

- HABC participated in the Mayor's walk of the community. The Management and Maintenance team identified abandoned vehicles on the site and had many of them removed; cleared trash on the site during the walk; and performed exterior maintenance work

Timeline

Thursday, July 6, 2023

- ORS and Operations provided support and assistance to residents, MONSE and other agencies on site as needed from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.

Friday, July 7, 2023

- HABC toured the Brooklyn Homes development with HUD officials
- ORS and Operations provided support and assistance to residents, MONSE and other agencies on site as needed from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.

Saturday, July 8, 2023

- ORS and Operations provided support and assistance to residents, MONSE and other agencies on site as needed from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.

Sunday, July 9, 2023

- ORS and Operations provided support and assistance to residents, MONSE and other agencies on site as needed from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.

Monday, July 10, 2023

- ORS continued its ongoing presence at Brooklyn Homes to provide daily trauma support and resource referrals to all residents who visit the Community Center or Management Office.
- ORS and Operations provided support and assistance to residents, MONSE and other agencies on site as needed from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.



Findings

- Upon notification of the mass shooting, HABC followed its routine emergency response and coordinated with city agencies and service providers.
- HABC believes that a more efficient coordination process among all agencies involved could have been realized by establishing a Joint Information Center.
- HABC realized that the requirement for prior approval for indoor and outdoor events defined in the lease was not included in the [Admissions and Continued Occupancy Policies \(ACOP\)](#)
- Realized there needs to be a more coordinated effort for large scale events.



Recommendations

- Prior to the Brooklyn mass shooting, HABC initiated several safety and security measures for all developments to include an expansion of HABC's security operations center and contractual armed security at each site.
- The emergency after hours number is currently widely promoted to residents, HABC will explore additional avenues to increase resident's awareness of this resource.
- HABC will engage a third-party to review our emergency response efforts and make recommendations to support more effective and efficient cross-collaboration among agencies.
- HABC will convene staff for emergency preparedness exercises.
- HABC is updating the guidelines to ensure that prior written approval is obtained from the Chief Operating Officer or designee within the HABC executive office prior to a resident or third-party holding an indoor or outdoor event that is held in the HABC common areas.

HABC's After Action Accountability



Prior to the Brooklyn mass shooting, HABC initiated several safety and security measures for all developments to include an expansion of HABC's security operations center and contractual armed security at each site.



HABC is updating the guidelines to ensure that prior written approval is obtained from the Chief Operating Officer or designee within the HABC executive office prior to a resident or third-party holding an indoor or outdoor event that is held in the HABC common areas.

In progress

HABC will engage a third-party to review our emergency response efforts and make recommendations to support more effective and efficient cross-collaboration among agencies.

In progress

The emergency after hours number is currently widely promoted to residents, HABC will explore additional avenues to increase resident's awareness of this resource.

AFTER ACTION REPORT



After Action Review Summary – Key Findings and Recommendations

Mayor's Office of Neighborhood Safety and Engagement (MONSE)

L023-0039

September 13, 2023



MONSE After Action Review Summary – Overview

MONSE's Role

- Established in December 2020, the Mayor's Office of Neighborhood Safety and Engagement (MONSE) replaced and re-scoped the office previously known as the Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice. The charge of the office is to coordinate citywide efforts to reduce crisis levels of gun violence immediately, while also addressing the long-term underlying factors that drive violence in Baltimore. MONSE is the lead agency responsible for implementation of the Mayor's Comprehensive Violence Prevention Plan (CVPP), a trauma-informed, community-centered, and evidence-based public health approach to stemming the tide of violence.
- MONSE's work focuses on development and coordination of an integrated violence prevention ecosystem in Baltimore. The agency's work is organized by three interconnected direct service lanes:
 - **Gun Violence Prevention** including Community Violence Intervention (CVI) programming based in neighborhoods, schools, and hospitals; and the Group Violence Reduction Strategy (GVRS), which connects people at the highest risk for gun violence with intensive life coaching and other wraparound supports while ensuring swift accountability for continued violence.
 - **Victim Services** including case management for victims of violence; referrals to service providers; intimate partner violence (IPV) prevention; operation of the Baltimore City Visitation Center; anti-human trafficking; and sexual assault response.
 - **Community Engagement and Opportunity** including youth diversion; re-entry support; Neighborhood Policing Plans (NPP); and Coordinated Neighborhood Stabilization Response (CNSR).



MONSE After Action Review Summary – Response Timeline

MONSE		Safe Streets Brooklyn
Saturday, July 1		<p>3:00 P.M. - Site staff first arrived at the event</p> <p>8:00 P.M. - M: Argument between groups</p> <p>8:20 P.M. - M: Relationship dispute</p> <p>8:45 P.M. - M: Individual exposed previously concealed weapon</p> <p>9:00 P.M. - Staff from different posts join staff at event</p> <p>9:00 P.M. - M: Individual thought to have a gun</p> <p>10:30 P.M. - M: Argument between groups</p> <p>11:30 P.M. - Staff left after shift ended at 11 P.M.</p>
Sunday, July 2	<p>12:42 A.M. - Received BPD First Net text alert</p> <p>2:21 A.M. - BPD PIO contacts MONSE Comms</p> <p>3:00 A.M. - MONSE Comms contacts BPD PIO</p> <p>4:44 A.M. - CAO Leach directive to MONSE</p> <p>7:30 A.M. - MONSE Comms briefs Interim Director</p> <p>8:00 A.M. - Joint statement released</p> <p>8:15 A.M. - MONSE emergency meeting</p> <p>8:22 A.M. - MONSE CVI contacts Safe Streets site</p> <p>10:00 A.M. - First MONSE staff on the ground</p> <p>10:48 A.M. - OEM text alert sent to the community</p> <p>11:34 A.M. - Second OEM text alert sent</p> <p>12:00 P.M. - MONSE fully activated in Brooklyn</p>	<p>1:00 A.M. - Site staff contact Site Director and remain on-site and/or at the hospital with victims until approximately 5:00 A.M.</p> <p>10:00 A.M. - Site staff join MONSE team on-site at Brooklyn Homes</p>

Coordinated Neighborhood Stabilization Response (CNSR)

A Coordinated Neighborhood Stabilization Response (CNSR) mobilizes City agencies and community-based partners to embed critical, readily accessible resources in a community over a 45-day period

➤ **Activation of CNSR – Initial Needs Assessment**

- MONSE team on the ground at Brooklyn Homes by noon on Sunday, July 2

➤ **Immediate, Intensive Stabilization Resources**

- July 2 – July 12 at Brooklyn Homes Community Center
- Direct Victim Services and Trauma-Responsive Services Provided Immediately
- Peace Mobile on site – mobile resource hub

➤ **Ongoing Support Tailored To The Community's Needs**

- July 13 – August 18
- Sustainable response to the specific ongoing needs of Brooklyn Homes residents
- MONSE partnering with CM Porter, community members, MOCFS & other agencies



MONSE After Action Review Summary – Response After July 2

CNSR Activation Partners



Councilwoman Phylicia Porter

MONSE Victim Services



BPD Victim Services

SAO Victim Services



Office of Emergency Management

Housing Authority of Baltimore City



Mayor's Office of Immigrant Affairs

Baltimore City Public Schools



UB Center for Criminal Justice Reform

Mayor's Office of Employment Development



Baltimore City Recreation and Parks

Mayor's Office of Children & Family Success

MOAAME

Baltimore City DSS

Maryland Responds

Baltimore Crisis Response, Inc.

Moms Demand Action

We Responders, Inc.

Catholic Charities

Red Cross

Safe Streets Baltimore

Baltimore City DHCD

Center for Hope - PAAVE

Transformation Healthcare, Inc.

Center for Urban Families

United Way

Delegate Gary Simmons

Delegate Luke Clippinger

Senator William Ferguson

Let's Thrive Baltimore

Linmar Leadership

4MyCity


CASA

Molock Cares LLC PRP

Greater Baybrook Alliance

Living Classrooms

ROAR Center at UMB



MONSE After Action Review Summary – Response Post-CNSR

Ongoing Support for the Community

- MONSE will continue to work with local organizations, faith leaders, and other partners to stay engaged in and support community-led event planning and resource provision efforts to ensure that City government is able to maintain supports for Brooklyn Homes residents post-CNSR.
- Some of this work has already started, with a calendar of meetings and events taking place post-CNSR activation included below:
 - Saturday, August 19 - Backpack and school uniform coordination for families
 - Monday, August 21 - We Our Us Community Walk (Gretna Ct)
 - Tuesday, August 22 - Youth and family engagement at the Baltimore Orioles Game (40 children and parents)
 - Thursday, August 24 - Bi-weekly Community Stakeholder meeting (non-public)
 - Saturday, August 26 - Coordinate families to attend Charm City Live event
 - Thursday, September 7 - After-Action Report Community Meeting
 - Saturday, September 9 - Community-Led Resource Fair
 - Thursday, September 21 - Bi-weekly Community Stakeholder meeting (non-public)
 - Saturday, September 23 - Coordinate families to attend Artscape
 - Sunday, September 24 - Coordinate families to attend Artscape
 - Wednesday, September 27 - Brooklyn Healing Day meeting (non-public)
 - Saturday, September 30 - Brooklyn Healing Day

MONSE After Action Review Summary – Key Findings and Recommendations

Role of Safe Streets Baltimore

- There are only informal practices -- no documented protocols -- regarding when and how Safe Streets staff share knowledge with MONSE CVI staff about large events or potential/emerging threats to public safety in their catchment zones.
 - → **Recommendation:** Update CVI Standard Operations Manual to expand the criteria for when Safe Streets staff escalate information about potential incidents to MONSE CVI staff.
- The scrutiny of Safe Streets' response to the incident made it apparent that there is some public confusion about Safe Streets Baltimore's role and its model.

→ **Recommendation:** Increase public communication and awareness about the daily work of Safe Streets Baltimore, what their evidence-based street outreach model looks like, and how they function as credible messengers with those at highest risk. Facilitate increased engagement between Safe Streets sites and key community stakeholders.



MONSE After Action Review Summary – Key Findings and Recommendations

Mobilization, Wraparound Supports, and Coordination

- Coordinated Neighborhood Stabilization Responses are constantly evolving activations that require the coordination of multiple interagency, cross-governmental and community-based partners to address residents' needs throughout the process. This work is relatively new to the City, being first piloted by MONSE in 2022, and a CNSR had never been deployed for an incident of the magnitude of the July 2 mass shooting.
- → **Recommendation:** Update the CNSR process map to ensure that protocols are consistent, fully developed, and up to date.
 - Establish a Joint Information Center (JIC) for future CNSR activations to streamline communication channels across stakeholders.
 - Ensure dates and commitments are locked down and promoted to community stakeholders and residents at least 48 hours in advance.



MONSE After Action Review Summary – Key Findings and Recommendations

Mobilization, Wraparound Supports, and Coordination (Continued)

- Over the course of the Brooklyn Homes CNSR, MONSE connected with 167 residents who expressed a need. Of the 98 requests for relocation and/or housing assistance MONSE received throughout the CNSR activation, 86 were from residents of Brooklyn Homes. To date, MONSE is providing some level of case management support to 19 victims (both primary and secondary) of the Brooklyn Homes mass shooting, with needs ranging from relocation assistance to ongoing mental health supports.
- → **Recommendation:** Build out an internal central information hub and database for resources and offers of assistance from external partners to limit service redundancy and ensure resident needs are more effectively met.
 - Work in partnership with BPD and SAO Victim Services to develop an interagency process map and regular coordinated case review meeting. Some of this work has already begun and should be institutionalized. Continue to actively work with partners to assess and process the remaining requests for support.






BALTIMORE CITY BROOKLYN COMMUNITY MASS SHOOTING INCIDENT: JULY 2, 2023





INCIDENT SUMMARY



Date and time

July 2, 2023 at 0035 hours



Incident type

Mass shooting incident



Location

839 Herndon Court, Brooklyn



Number of patients

30 patients total, 28 with gunshot wounds, 2 medical emergencies

A mass shooting incident occurred on July 2, 2023 at 0035 hours at 839 Herndon Court in Brooklyn resulting in 30 patients, mostly with gunshot wounds.

RESPONSE AGENCIES



- **Baltimore City Fire Department**
First responders to the mass shooting incident
- **Baltimore Police Department**
Assisted the fire department in securing the scene
- **Office of Emergency Management**
Coordinated the multi-agency response
- **Mayor's Office of Neighborhood Safety and Engagement**
Engaged in community outreach after the incident
- **Housing Authority**
Provided access to housing for displaced residents
- **Department of Transportation**
Assisted with road closures and traffic control

UNITS IN SERVICE

NIGHT SHIFT 1700 HOURS – 0700 HOURS



EMS

All Medic Units were in service



Suppression

Engine 4, 13, and 20 closed due to personnel shortages

Truck 3 closed due to mechanical issues

In total, there were 4 Suppression Units closed.

STATUS REPORT



- Log of calls into Brooklyn Homes Area (12 hours before)
 - 800 Clintwood Ct
 - 815 Herndon Ct
 - 819 Gretna Ct
 - 4101 Cleve Ct
- Units in Service at Time of Call
 - Medic Units – 5, including closest unit
 - Suppression Units – 24, including closest unit

CALLS FOR SERVICE



30+ Calls for Service to the area

Vehicle disturbances, loud music complaints, armed person, discharging of a firearm, vehicle accident, DWI, reports of shooting, hang up calls, and multiple calls for incident unknown

The 911 Call Center received over 300+ calls , and over 30 calls for service.

RESOURCES DEPLOYED



Total BCFD Response

18



BCFD Supervisor

6



BCFD Suppression

4



BCFD Medics

8

RESOURCES DEPLOYED



Anne Arundel County Fire Department

2




Baltimore County Fire Department

1



Howard County Department of Fire & Rescue

2



Private Ambulance

2

Mutual Aid Resources

PATIENT TRANSPORT



9 patients transported

9 total patients were transported from the scene to area hospitals



6 patient transferred

All patients were transferred from Harbor Hospital to Shock Trauma


In total, 9 patients were immediately transported and 6 walk-ins at Harbor Hospital required additional transfer.

PATIENT STATUS



30 total patients

There were 30 patients involved in the mass shooting incident.



28 gunshot wounds

28 of the 30 patients suffered from gunshot wounds.



2 medical emergencies

The other 2 patients had unrelated medical emergencies.

The incident involved 30 patients, with 28 gunshot wound victims and 2 unrelated medical emergencies.

HOSPITAL DISTRIBUTION



- Harbor Hospital

Transferred patients to Shock Trauma

- Shock Trauma

Received patient transfers from Harbor Hospital

- Anne Arundel County Medical Center


One of the hospitals receiving patients

- St. Agnes Hospital

One of the hospitals receiving patients

- University of Maryland

One of the hospitals receiving patients



RECOVERY EFFORTS




Activated Community Resource Center

Opened the Housing Authority Community Resource Center to support residents



Provided mental health services

Mobilized mental health professionals to assist victims and community members



Engaged community outreach

Conducted door-to-door outreach and community walks to connect with residents

OEM collaborated with agencies to activate resources and services to support community recovery after the incident.

SUMMARY



The Brooklyn Mass Shooting was a tragic event. In consideration of the quick response by BCFD, BPD, OEM and jurisdictional partners in Region III, assessments, triage and care was administered without haste and patients were transported to definitive care and survived. Subsequent to the initial community impact, the Office of Emergency Management (OEM) swiftly convened local government, private sector and state assets to address the immediate needs of the community.

Successes and Areas of Improvements were identified among the collaborative effort within the following areas:

Core Capability

- Planning
- Operation Coordination
- Environmental Response/Health and Safety
- Community Resilience
- Economic and Community Recovery
- Logistics and Supply Chain
- Management
- Operational Coordination Public Information and Warning
- Mass Care Services
- Public Health, Healthcare, and Emergency Medical Services